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ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES AND AGENCY POLICY
DEVELOPMENT: THE KOCH WAY
Ronald M. Levin*

ABSTRACT
Among the creative contributions that the late Charles H. Koch, Jr., made to
administrative law thinking was his exploration of the present and potential role of
administrative judges as policymakers. Charles stood in firm opposition to recent
trends that, in his view, had served to strengthen the policymaking role of administrative judges at the expense of agency heads. He insisted that ultimate control over the
policy direction of a program should rest with the officials who have been appointed
to administer that program. While adhering to this baseline, however, Charles gravitated over time toward a nuanced view that sought to define an affirmative role for
administrative judges in the policymaking process. He suggested, for example, that
these judges could be helpful to agencies by initiating proposals for new directions and
by building records that would enable agencies to appraise those proposals. In this
sense, he argued, administrative judges could work in collaboration with, rather than
at cross-purposes with, the agencies to which they are answerable.
This memorial essay aims to review Charles’s analysis of this generally neglected
topic and to contribute a few additional insights to the discussion. After examining the
background issue of where ultimate policy control should rest, the essay describes and
evaluates several of Charles’s ideas for refinement of the role of administrative judges
as policymakers. In addition, the essay takes up related questions regarding agencies’
use of regulations and guidance documents to circumscribe the policy choices that
administrative judges make.
INTRODUCTION
The scholarship of the late Charles H. Koch, Jr., ranged over numerous topics in
administrative law, both domestic and global, as the articles in this memorial symposium attest. For my contribution, I will focus on an article that Charles wrote about the
role of administrative judges as policymakers. I corresponded with Charles on this subject in the spring of 2011, shortly before his passing, and I will draw upon that correspondence, as well as the underlying article, as the basis for reviewing and probing his
analysis of the topic and for adding some thoughts of my own.
* William R. Orthwein Distinguished Professor of Law, Washington University in St.
Louis. I thank Michael Asimow and Jeffrey Lubbers for their comments on an early draft of
this essay.
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In the early 1990s, Charles participated as one of several consultants to the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) in a study of the administrative law judiciary.1 The study examined the roles of both “administrative law judges”
(ALJs) and other administrative adjudicators, often called “administrative judges”
(AJs).2 The ACUS recommendation emanating from that study articulated a seemingly unequivocal position:
Where the agency has made its policies known in an appropriate
fashion, ALJs and AJs are bound to apply them in individual cases.
Policymaking is the realm of the agency, and the ALJ’s (or AJ’s)
role is to apply such policies to the facts that the judge finds in an
individual case.3
As Charles noted to me in our recent correspondence, he would have agreed with
that statement at the time the ACUS made it. But, he continued, after talking with administrative judges “I began to see that our (ad law’s) thinking is insufficient . . . .”4 In
his more evolved view, he ceased to regard policymaking as falling exclusively within
“the realm of the agency.”5 Accordingly, he eventually undertook to envision and describe an affirmative role for administrative judges in the process of administrative
policymaking. This role, he thought, could include policy incubation and related recordbuilding.6 In this fashion, he argued, the interaction between administrative adjudicators
and agency heads in regard to policymaking could be coordinated rather than antagonistic.7 He spelled out this vision most comprehensively in an article published in the
Alabama Law Review in 2005, entitled Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary.8
1

Paul R. Verkuil, Daniel J. Gifford, Charles H. Koch, Jr., Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Jeffrey
S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary, 1992 A.C.U.S. 773.
2
See id. at 779–81.
3
ACUS Recommendation 92-7, The Federal Administrative Judiciary, 57 Fed. Reg.
61,760, 61,763 (Dec. 29, 1992).
4
E-mail from Charles H. Koch, Jr. to author (April 21, 2011) (on file with author).
5
ACUS Recommendation 92-7, 57 Fed. Reg. at 61,763.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV.
693 (2005) [hereinafter Koch, Policymaking], reprinted in 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDGES 49 (2005). Charles published a shorter version of the same basic analysis in Charles
H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Judges’ Role in Developing Social Policy, 68 LA. L. REV. 1095
(2008) [hereinafter Koch, Developing Social Policy]. The latter article has had a global reach
of its own, as it has been translated into Chinese. 79 ADMIN. L. REV. (CHINA) 140 (Song Dong
& Deng Yun-cheng trans., 2012). I include a few citations to this shorter piece in the present
essay, but where I refer in the text to “the article,” I mean the more comprehensive treatment
in the Alabama Law Review. Finally, for an op-ed version of the argument, see Charles H.
Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring
2004, at 2.
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In the following pages, I will offer what amounts to a review essay responding to
that article.
I hope that a close look at Charles’s writing in this area will prove worthwhile
not only as a tribute to a learned and insightful scholar, but also because the subject
is a comparatively neglected one. Administrative adjudication as a whole gets much
less attention in modern scholarship than rulemaking does. Furthermore, the precise
role that administrative judges should play in this process is not as well defined as
it might be. A recent article by Russell Weaver and Linda Jellum describes them as
“neither fish nor fowl” in the administrative law bestiary.9 I hope in this essay to clarify some taxonomic issues. I will first examine the background issue of where ultimate policy control should rest. Then I will identify, and critically evaluate, several of
Charles’s ideas for refinement of the role of administrative judges as policymakers.
My analysis first explores these ideas as they play out in purely adjudicative contexts;
then it brings the role of regulations and policy guidance into the equation.
In this essay, I follow Charles’s terminology by referring to the frontline adjudicators in administrative litigation as “administrative judges.” As he noted, the more
common term “administrative law judges” is sometimes used in a broad sense,10 but
careful writers limit it to those individuals who fit within a civil service category of
hearing officers who enjoy specific tenure and salary protection under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).11 Many other adjudicators, typically called administrative
judges or AJs, lack the job and salary protection of ALJs, but they perform essentially
identical functions at the agencies in which they are housed.12 For present purposes,
I use the term “administrative judges” to encompass both categories, as Charles did.
I refer to “administrative law judges” only when the context makes the narrower term
directly relevant.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES AND POLICY CONTROL: ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS
The starting point for Charles’s analysis was the familiar proposition that agencies
often use the adjudication process as a vehicle for policy development.13 The classic
administrative law cases of SEC v. Chenery Corp.,14 NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,15
and NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.16 are commonly cited for the insight that agencies
must have broad discretion to use adjudication rather than rulemaking for this purpose.17
9

Russell L. Weaver & Linda D. Jellum, Neither Fish Nor Fowl: Administrative Judges
in the Modern Administrative State, 28 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 243 (2010).
10
See Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 701 & n.40.
11
5 U.S.C. §§ 5372, 7321 (2006).
12
See Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 701 n.40.
13
Id. at 696–700.
14
332 U.S. 194 (1947).
15
394 U.S. 759 (1969).
16
416 U.S. 267 (1974).
17
See, e.g., Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202–03; Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. at 772; Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 294.
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Even an agency that is generally receptive to the latter process will usually recognize
that rulemaking is unsuitable in some policy-laden contexts, such as where a consensus
on how to deal at large with the subject matter would be too difficult to forge. From the
pervasiveness of policy in adjudication, it is only a short step to the truism that the officials who hear those cases—administrative judges—will inevitably have to make policy
judgments on interstitial issues that arise in the course of deciding those cases.18
But this inescapable aspect of the decisional process is not quite the same as policy
making, if by that term we mean the creation of norms that will have staying power. As
the ACUS recommendation quoted above reflects, federal law has generally treated the
agency head as the authoritative source of policy within the agency. A representative
pronouncement from the case law is that of the D.C. Circuit in Iran Air v. Kugelman.19
In that case, an exporter that had been exonerated at the trial level in a sanctions case
argued that, under the language of the applicable judicial review statute, the ALJ’s
decision could not be reversed by the agency head to the detriment of the exporter.20
In an opinion by then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the court concluded that, even if
the statutory language was susceptible of that interpretation, the implications of the
exporter’s reading rendered it inherently implausible:
The Under Secretary responds . . . that the agency head—the
Secretary or his designee—“must be the final administrative arbiter of legal questions concerning the export control program,”
and therefore must “ha[ve] the power to correct legal errors of the
ALJ.” . . . We agree. Whatever else Congress meant . . . it did not
mean to disarm the agency head when the ALJ incorrectly reads
the law in the charged party’s favor.
It is commonly recognized that ALJs “are entirely subject to
the agency on matters of law” [quoting Professor Antonin Scalia].
As one veteran ALJ explained:
The basic concept of the independent administrative
law judge requires that he conduct the cases over which
he presides with complete objectivity and independence.
In so operating, however, he is governed, as in the case
of any trial court, by the applicable and controlling precedents. These precedents include the applicable statutes and agency regulations, the agency’s policies as laid
down in its published decisions, and applicable court
decisions . . . .
18
19
20

See Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 702 & n.42, 717.
996 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1257.
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. . . [O]nce the agency has ruled on a given matter, [moreover,] it is not open to reargument by the administrative
law judge; . . . although an administrative law judge on occasion may privately disagree with the agency’s treatment
of a given problem, it is not his proper function to express
such disagreement in his published rulings or decisions.21
A corollary of the court’s position is that an administrative judge’s decisions do not
have precedential effect in the federal system. As Charles noted, a regime in which AJs
tend to adhere to prior decisions by other AJs can promote desirable evenhandedness
in some situations, but, in other circumstances, the attempt to maintain such consistency would be unmanageable and may interfere with the goal of providing individualized justice.22 In any event, the value of adherence by AJs to “horizontal” precedent
in a given situation should be considered in prudential terms, rather than as a matter
of formal legal obligation.23 In short, even where the AJ’s decision remains, the final
agency action for purposes of an individual adjudication, the cases seem to indicate that
it should not be understood as declaring the policy of the agency in a wider sense.24
21

Id. at 1260 (citation omitted) (quoting Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco—A Reprise,
47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 62 (1979), and Joseph Zwerdling, Reflections on the Role of an
Administrative Law Judge, 25 ADMIN. L. REV. 9, 12–13 (1973)); see also Nash v. Bowen,
869 F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989) (“An ALJ is a creature of statute and, as such, is subordinate to the Secretary in matters of policy and interpretation of law.”).
22
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 711–12.
23
Id.; Koch, Developing Social Policy, supra note 8, at 1099 n.13 (“[AJs] should not feel
in any way bound by their colleagues’ prior treatment of like cases.”). Similarly, according
to the Seventh Circuit, disagreements among administrative judges’ decisions within a single
agency do not constitute a breach of the agency’s duty to avoid arbitrary inconsistency. See Ho
v. Donovan, 569 F.3d 677, 681–82 (7th Cir. 2009). The petitioner in Ho v. Donovan complained that an ALJ in his case had been less lenient than other ALJs in other cases. Id. at 681.
In an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, the court responded:
Explanation is required when the agency changes course. “The agency”
means the Secretary, and the Secretary has not revised either regulations
or practices. It is common for subordinate officials, including ALJs, to
have different understandings of rules’ meaning. That different ALJs
apply [the regulation in this case] differently does not show that the
agency has changed course; it shows only why there is a need for appellate
review within any system of adjudication. None of the ALJs is authorized
to set or change agency policy; only the Secretary can do that. If ALJs
apply the regulations differently, the remedy is an appeal to the Secretary.
Id. at 682.
24
See also Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 180, 186–87 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
immigration judges’ decisions, even if summarily affirmed by the Board of Immigration
Appeals, do not constitute the agency’s position for purposes of the Chenery doctrine that an
administrative decision may be upheld only on grounds endorsed by the agency; thus, a remand
to obtain an authoritative ruling from the Board was required). The court interpreted INS v.
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As I will explain below, Charles would not have agreed with the court in Iran
Air that ALJs should refrain from even mentioning their disagreements with agency
policy while deciding cases, but, in other respects, he fully agreed with the thrust of
the court’s position. As he wrote, “the administrative review authority, either the
agency head or its representative, has the final word—the power to speak for the
‘agency’ as a whole.”25 Elsewhere he declared: “It is . . . necessary that the agency
have the final authority regarding policy. That authority is necessary for uniformity
and consistency.”26 Moreover, Charles argued, “[a]dministrative judges are one level
further removed from the democratic institutions than are the agencies they serve.”27
Although delegations to agencies are inevitable, he said, they are monitored indirectly
through political oversight, but administrative judges lack even that indirect form of
accountability to the democratic process.28
These theoretical premises of the federal system are embedded in, and also reinforced by, what Charles termed the hierarchical model of administrative adjudication.29
The APA codifies a version of that model. Under that Act, an ALJ makes an “initial”
or “recommended” decision, which is then appealable to the agency head or another
decisionmaking body that sets policy for the agency.30 The APA underscores the
agency’s primacy by providing that, in such an appeal, “the agency has all the powers
which it would have in making the initial decision.”31
The above generalizations about administrative judges’ policymaking responsibilities, or lack thereof, do not hold true in all agency adjudication systems. If we
expand our perspective to examine the domain of state administrative law, as well as
atypical federal programs, we can see a range of structural arrangements that give administrative judges a louder voice on policy than the standard federal model permits.
For example, about half the states have established central panels of ALJs.32 In a central
panel system, adjudicators are housed within an entity that is structurally removed
Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002), as establishing the same proposition by implication.
Ucelo-Gomez, 448 F.3d at 186.
25
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 701.
26
Id. at 733.
27
Koch, Developing Policy, supra note 8, at 1103.
28
Id.
29
See Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 700–01.
30
5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006). An initial decision “becomes the decision of the agency without further proceedings unless there is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within
time provided by rule.” Id. A recommended decision, in contrast, is merely a recommendation
to the agency leadership, which must take action before any legally effective decision can flow
from the proceeding. Thus, under the APA model, review of the ALJ’s decision by the agency
heads is either an option (as with the initial decision) or a necessity (as with the recommended
decision). See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
82 (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL].
31
§ 557(b).
32
See James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in Central Panels and ALJ Final
Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 401, 403–06 (2005) [hereinafter Flanagan, Update].
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from any one agency whose decisions they review.33 Some federal regulatory schemes
have a split-enforcement or split-function model, in which an enforcement agency’s
decisions are reviewed by a separate adjudicatory tribunal.34 The most drastic departure from the federal model is to give administrative judges final decisional authority,
meaning that their decisions may be reviewed by a court, but not by the originating
agency. Louisiana and South Carolina have some of the most prominent systems of
this kind.35
A full evaluation of these alternatives to the standard federal model is outside the
scope of this essay. For present purposes, it should suffice to make clear that Charles
did not support alternatives of this kind. Models in which administrative judges’ decisions may not be reviewed by agency heads have been widely criticized in the scholarly literature.36 Charles joined in that criticism,37 but he also went further. His article
included a substantial critique of the central panel system—whether or not it provided
for an appeal back to the agency.38 Much of the administrative law world accepts the
central panels approach, at least at the state level.39 But Charles disapproved of it, arguing that central panel judges, who serve multiple agencies, lack “the expertise and
experience inherent in the traditional scheme”; thus, he continued, “the panel structure
replaces a specialized, program-sensitive judicial community with an isolated, generalist
administrative judiciary.”40 Likewise, he was critical of the split-enforcement model,41
33

Id. at 401.
See generally George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (1987) (discussing
the split-enforcement model and proposing recommendations for its use).
35
Flanagan, Update, supra note 32, at 406–10. Flanagan counts Florida, North Carolina,
and Oregon as states with “de facto finality” because they have adopted procedures or standards
of review that make it difficult for agencies to overturn ALJ decisions. James F. Flanagan,
Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact
on State ALJ Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1355, 1376–82
(2002) [hereinafter Flanagan, Redefining].
36
See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALJ Independence, and Administrative Courts:
The Recent Changes in Louisiana’s Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REV. 431, 454–63
(1999); Flanagan, Redefining, supra note 35, at 1399–1420; Flanagan, Update, supra note
32, at 410–34; Jim Rossi, Final, but Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with ALJ Finality,
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 53, 64–66 (2004); Weaver & Jellum, supra note 9, at 258. For a more
positive view, see NCALJ Panel Discussion: ALJ Decisions—Final or Fallible?, 25 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 191 passim (2005) (comments of Judge John Hardwicke, in dialogue
with Professors Flanagan and Rossi).
37
See Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 736–37.
38
Id. at 733–35.
39
See, e.g., Flanagan, Update, supra note 32, at 402; see also MODEL STATE ADMIN.
PROCEDURE ACT §§ 601–607 (2010) (providing a model statute for states that desire to establish a central panel).
40
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 733–36; see also infra note 58 and accompanying text.
41
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 738–39.
34
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although its defenders include some highly regarded academic observers.42 In his view,
this model detracted too much from the enforcement agency’s ability to develop policy
through the adjudicative process, as Wyman-Gordon and kindred cases contemplate.43
My correspondence with Charles in 2011 confirmed that he had not changed his
mind about the unwisdom, as he saw it, of these alternatives to the traditional hierarchical model. I pointed out that in recent months the National Conference of the Administrative Law Judiciary (NCALJ) had sought to induce the ABA House of Delegates
to oppose Article 6 of the 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA),
in part because it did not invite states to consider giving final decisional authority to
ALJs. I described how the ABA’s Administrative Law Section had led the opposition
to this resolution and had successfully negotiated to induce the NCALJ to accept a
weaker version, which the House of Delegates then passed.44 Charles heartily approved:
“Beating back the final decision movement is god’s work. We need to do more . . . .
Theoretically it short circuits the whole administrative adjudication strategy. Ad law
types need to take a strong and effective stand.”45
What is intriguing about Charles’s conception of the administrative judge as policymaker is that he evolved it within the bounds of his commitment to the model in which
the ultimate control of policy rests with the agency head. The next section of this essay
outlines his perspective.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE HIERARCHY
The gist of Charles’s thesis was that, within limits, AJs should occasionally be
willing to challenge prevailing agency precedent, and agencies should be receptive to
considering these challenges.46 He argued that, in the administrative world, stare decisis
is by no means absolute.47 Agencies may not ignore their precedents, but they are free
to revise them if they acknowledge that they are doing so.48 Stare decisis promotes
stability, predictability, and reliance, but agencies should also be willing to adapt to
42

See id. at 738 (discussing favorable assessments by Daniel Gifford and Richard Fallon,
together with skeptical comments by other scholars).
43
Id. at 738–39.
44
For the final resolution, see ABA House of Delegates, Resolution 112 (Feb. 14, 2011),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2011_my_112
.authcheckdam.pdf.
45
E-mail from Charles H. Koch, Jr. to author (May 20, 2011) (on file with author).
46
See Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 712.
47
Id. at 703.
48
Id. at 703–05. Today Charles could cite FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. for this
proposition. 556 U.S. 502 (2009). Fox would, however, cast doubt on the immediately following language in Charles’s article: “[Agencies] are allowed to continually adjust their precedent
so long as they apply the new view until faced with a sound reason for adjusting that view; they
are held to precedent only until a change can be justified.” Koch, Policymaking, supra note
8, at 703. Under Fox, an agency does not necessarily need to justify a change in precedent;
generally, it only needs to justify its new position on its own terms. 556 U.S. at 515.
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new circumstances and to learn from experience.49 Drawing upon the theories of
Professor Evan Caminker regarding the role of hierarchy in the civil litigation system,50
Charles considered the potential benefits that may ensue when an adjudicator engages
in “underruling”51 of precedents that are out of keeping with the judge’s conscience
and “street-level perspective.”52 To this extent, Charles would have parted company
with the ALJ who, as quoted in Iran Air, maintained that an administrative law judge
should simply keep quiet about any policy disagreements that he or she may have with
agency leadership.
Charles made clear (and explained that Caminker also made clear) that an AJ’s
“creative deviation,” if tolerated at all, should be exceptional.53 Adherence to precedent should be the norm, not only because the agency head has a right to control the
agency’s policies in the program as a theoretical matter, but also because such adherence promotes efficiency and public confidence in the agency’s case law.54 Indeed, the
agency has the option to spurn any such “assistance” from the AJ if it finds no merit
therein. But Charles urged agency heads to give serious consideration to policy inputs
from below: “Justice seems best served by a norm of obedience in which the lowerlevel adjudicators generally seek to obey agency policy expressed in superior precedent,
and where an administrative review authority representing the agency as an institution
is available to test that obedience but take advantage of studied disobedience.”55 He
also urged agencies to experiment with creative methods of bringing administrative
judges into the policymaking process.56 As he recognized, judges in civil-law nations
typically play an “inquisitorial” role in controlling their proceedings, and there is room
for administrative judges to follow the lead of that model.57
The affirmative role that Charles thought administrative judges should play helps
to explain why he did not approve of the central panel systems that have been so widely
adopted in the states. In such a system, he argued, administrative judges are generalists
and do not acquire the specialized knowledge that is crucial to the contributions that
they should make to the policymaking process.58
49

Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 704–05.
See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?,
46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 866–67 (1994).
51
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 706–07.
52
Id. at 709.
53
Id. at 706–07; see Caminker, supra note 50, at 867.
54
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 707–08.
55
Id. at 709.
56
Id. at 710–11; see also ACUS Recommendation 2013-1, Improving Consistency in Social
Security Disability Adjudications, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,352, ¶ 3(d) (June 10, 2013) (suggesting that
the Social Security Administration should allow ALJs to serve for limited periods on the
Appeals Council, in part to “benefit the Appeals Council by introducing the perspectives and
insights of ALJs”).
57
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 700 n.36.
58
Id. at 733–34.
50
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An issue that Charles’s article left open is how far the administrative judge may go
in challenging the agency’s prevailing policy. The judge might actually enter judgment
in defiance of precedent. Or the judge might explain why he or she disagrees with the
agency’s extant policy but adheres to it in the actual disposition of the case at the hearing level. The latter choice would put the onus on the party who would benefit from
a changed policy to take an appeal and prevail on the agency heads (or other superior
reviewing authority) to consider whether to alter the policy to conform to the judge’s
suggestion. In my correspondence with Charles, I noted that the latter is the approach
that the Supreme Court expects from the lower courts.59 He agreed that this might
be the better solution for an administrative judge.60 I do not suggest that this qualification should somehow be retrospectively read into Charles’s articles, but at the very
least it points toward a course of action that administrative judges should consider in
“underruling” situations. Indeed, an administrative judge’s opinion routinely becomes
part of the judicial review record,61 and a reviewing court would surely be attentive to
the agency’s response, or lack of response, to the judge’s analysis.
III. BUILDING A RECORD
Charles’s analysis of the potential positive contributions that administrative judges
can make in policymaking found concrete expression in his discussion of recordbuilding at the hearing level. He contended that an administrative judge must sometimes go beyond the parties’ choices in order to build an adequate record for agency
policymaking.62 As he noted, an agency’s development of new policy in adjudication
must often rest on a foundation of “legislative facts.”63 “Unfortunately,” he wrote, “the
59

See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”);
see also United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001) (reaffirming this expectation but
overruling precedent as recommended by lower court); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20
(1997) (same).
60
E-mail from Charles H. Koch, Jr. to author (May 20, 2011) (on file with author).
61
See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 493 (1951).
62
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 729–30.
63
Id. at 726–27. Even in the courts, the policymaking task sometimes leads judges to take
account of nonrecord facts, although some scholars are ambivalent about this tendency. See
Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012);
Frederick Schauer, The Decline of “The Record”: A Comment on Posner, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 51
(2013). Agencies have traditionally been viewed as having even more leeway in this regard.
See Ernest Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal Administrative Hearings,
1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 43 & n.190; see also 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 10.6, at 750–54 (4th ed. 2002) (“The court has long allowed agencies to resolve
issues of legislative fact based on judgment and expertise, rather than evidence.”). Nevertheless,
modern doctrines of “hard look” judicial review circumscribe an agency’s ability to act on
the basis of unsupported claims of expertise. See, e.g., Int’l Union v. MSHA, 626 F.3d 84,
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administrative hearing, like the trial, is controlled by the litigants . . . . The parties—
even the agency staff—are not motivated to introduce those facts because they may not
be necessary to resolve the particular dispute. Indeed, the parties may have some incentive to divert attention from these facts.”64 The judge must therefore play an active
role in assembling the necessary record. Charles also contemplated that administrative
judges should “actively seek experts related to the issues,”65 make creative use of official notice to expand the record (after giving parties an opportunity for rebuttal),66 and
solicit intervention by interested persons whose participation could contribute to a
fuller airing of the issues than the original parties would have supplied.67
The “unfortunately” quoted in the preceding paragraph is an eye-opener. Not
everyone would think, at least at first blush, that party control of the development of
the record is unusual, let alone regrettable. In order to evaluate Charles’s somewhat
unorthodox line of argument, I think it will be helpful to consider several discrete
situations.68 The first and perhaps least problematic would arise where the administrative judge undertakes to build a record for consideration of a policy innovation that
she knows or has good reason to expect will be one that the agency itself wants to see
explored. The agency might have given this signal in dicta in an earlier case, or even
in an opinion remanding this very case for further consideration. With respect to this
situation, Charles’s arguments about the judge’s role are quite persuasive. The policymaking process should begin at the hearing level, so that the facts can be developed
in an orderly way and the parties can be heard regarding them.69 He offers a cogent
analogy between the judge’s proactive inquiry and the traditional doctrine of official
notice, under which an agency has long been permitted to rely on evidence that the
parties did not choose to bring out, provided that the parties are given an adequate opportunity for rebuttal.70 Continuing with the premise that the agency wants the judge
94 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Tripoli Rocketry Ass’n v. ATFE, 437 F.3d 75, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Jim
Rossi, Judicial Review of Issues of Fact, in A GUIDE TO POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
FEDERAL AGENCIES 159, 171–75 (John Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005).
64
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 727 (emphasis added).
65
Id. at 728.
66
Id. at 729.
67
Id. at 730.
68
One familiar situation in which administrative judges may be expected to develop a
record proactively occurs when the statute requires the agency’s decision to turn on an issue
that a litigant did not address. For example, the judge might help a pro se litigant, such as a disability benefits claimant, meet the required burden of proof. See, e.g., Koch, Policymaking,
supra note 8, at 726 & n.165; see also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 470–73 (1983)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (faulting the ALJ in that case for failing to fulfill this responsibility);
id. at 473–76 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). I do not discuss
this function here, because such a case would almost invariably turn on established policy,
not a policy innovation.
69
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 726–29.
70
Id. at 729. As mentioned above, agencies are sometimes permitted to act on the basis
of unsupported factual propositions. See supra note 63. Charles’s point, however, was that
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to lay a foundation for the policy initiative in question, I see no reason to question
Charles’s suggestion that the judge may liberally resort to inviting interested persons
to file amicus briefs71 or even to intervene in the proceeding.
A second situation would be one in which the agency head has not indicated interest in a potential new policy, but one of the parties wants to make a case for such a
policy change. Again, the hearing level is the logical stage in the adjudicative process
at which any legislative facts that must underlie such a new policy should be developed.
In principle, the administrative judge could accommodate the party’s goal without having to take a position personally as to the desirability of the policy change. However,
the judge might well have some decisions to make about how much leeway to allow
the party’s advocacy of the policy, especially if the policy would be at odds with longstanding or settled agency precedent. Charles emphasized in his article that administrative judges have experience and familiarity with the agency’s case law and practices
that they can bring to bear on their role in the development of administrative policymaking.72 A judge might well want to draw on that valuable experience and knowledge in deciding whether to allow the party to put on a full case, or merely tender an
offer of proof, or do something in between.
Finally, we have the situation in which neither the agency nor a party has sought
exploration of a potential new policy, but the administrative judge thinks it would
be a good idea. Under these circumstances, is record-building for such a policy shift
an appropriate function for the judge? Charles’s answer was essentially what one
would expect from the thesis of the article: Administrative judges should generally
adhere to agency policy, but occasionally they should nudge the agency to consider
a new initiative and should proactively find facts that would form the predicate for
such consideration.73
However, what is distinctive about the record-building function is that it may impose costs on the parties to the case. Those costs may include protracted delay as well
as the possible burdens of having to present a case in opposition to the proposed policy.
Detours into issues that the parties have no interest in pursuing could potentially get
out of hand. Charles was not oblivious to these concerns.74 He remarked that
where sound practice (if not due process) does require an agency to build a record, this factual development should ordinarily occur at the hearing stage, at which an ALJ or AJ typically presides.
71
As Charles recognized, in the litigation that led up to Wyman-Gordon, the NLRB did
invite amicus briefs before deciding on and announcing its new policy of requiring employers to furnish lists of employees to unions. See Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at
730; see also Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB’s Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 599 (1970).
72
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 730.
73
Id. at 727, 730.
74
In comparable circumstances, other authors have been less circumspect. A recent article
recommends that courts should regularly invite notice and comment on the legal and policy
issues raised by cases pending before them. See Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby,
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[t]he litigants, both the private litigant and the agency staff, are
now engaged in a policymaking proceeding and acquire the responsibility for representing either the established policy or a need
for adjustment. This is an unfair burden. A judge must weigh the
fairness of doing what is essentially “agency” business at the expense of the private party.75
Thus, for example, “where the need [for intervention] strays too far beyond the
focus of the individual dispute, the better approach [for the judge] may be to note
the need and leave the job of considering how to incorporate broader participation
to the agency.”76 A fair inference from these cautionary words would seem to be that
the extent to which the administrative judge may properly build a record for new
policy issues during an adjudication should depend in significant part on how much
burden this choice would place on the litigants in the case.
IV. RULES AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
Another dimension of the challenge of defining and delimiting the status of administrative judges as policymakers is uncertainty about the appropriate role of regulations and guidance documents in establishing agency policy. The presence or absence
of such controls does much to determine, as a practical matter, the amount of space that
administrative judges possess for policymaking in the (limited) sense that Charles’s
thesis envisioned. Indeed, he discussed this aspect of the issue at length in his article.77
A. What Agencies May Do
Charles built his analysis around the familiar distinction between legislative rules
(also called “substantive rules,” and sometimes “regulations”), on the one hand, and
guidance documents (interpretive rules and policy statements), on the other.78 Legislative rules have the force of law.79 Accordingly, they are binding not only on the public,
Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965 (2009). The authors
argue persuasively that this procedure would improve the quality of judicial decisionmaking,
at least some of the time. Id. at 1006–17. But they make no mention of the litigants’ countervailing interest in obtaining a speedy and inexpensive resolution of their dispute.
75
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 731.
76
Id. at 730.
77
Id. at 713–20.
78
Charles termed this class of documents “nonlegislative rules” in his Alabama Law
Review article, Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 715, but termed them “guidance documents” in a later article. See Koch, Developing Social Policy, supra note 8, at 1102. Both
terms are commonly used.
79
See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979); Batterton v. Francis, 432
U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977); ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 30, at 30 n.3; Kristin
E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 473–84 (2013).
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but also on the agency and its employees, including its ALJs.80 This proposition is generally acknowledged (although Charles was less categorical about it than some other
writers).81 To be sure, the meaning of a legislative rule may be debatable in a given
case. Essentially, however, the status of these rules as a constraint on the agency is not
controversial. Administrative judges must comply with such a rule until it is revoked
or invalidated, just as an agency head must.82
With guidance documents, it is a different story. By definition, they do not have
the “force of law,” but they surely exert, and should exert, some constraining effects
within the agency.83 The manner and extent to which this is true is not well defined in
modern administrative law.84 And if the point is unclear as to staff generally, one might
be even more uncertain about the effect of such pronouncements on administrative
judges, who in at least some contexts are expected to maintain “independence” from the
agency leadership. Many AJs do not believe such documents are binding on them.85
Charles spoke to the uncertain status of agency guidance in his article.86 His basic
claim that such statements have less bite than legislative rules is undeniable, but his
effort to explain their status in doctrinal terms strikes me as not altogether successful.
He discussed Morton v. Ruiz87 as standing for the proposition that agency personnel
may deviate from the prescriptions of an agency manual when it is “fair” to do so;88 but
Ruiz is not a well-regarded case among administrative law scholars,89 and Charles’s
80

Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 714–15 & n.103.
Charles detected some wiggle room in the Supreme Court case of United States v.
Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 714 n.103. However,
Caceres may be better seen as a perplexing outlier that is anything but helpful in determining
the legal effect of legislative rules. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569, 579–82, 584 (2006). Indeed, the actual rule in Caceres may not
have fallen within the category of legislative rules in the first place, although the Court did
not focus on that point. See id. at 580, 601.
82
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 715.
83
See, e.g., Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 599 (5th Cir.
1995) (“Indeed, what purpose would an agency’s statement of policy serve if agency employees
could not refer to it for guidance?”).
84
For a severely critical assessment of efforts to apply the “binding effect” criterion, see
Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents,
90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 346–52 (2011). As one indication of the subtlety of the law’s line-drawing
in this area, see ACUS Recommendation 92-2, Agency Policy Statements, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,103,
30,104, ¶ 3 (July 8, 1992) (stating that an agency may make a policy statement “authoritative
for staff officials,” but should nevertheless “advise staff [that] such policy guidance does not
constitute . . . an independent basis for action”).
85
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. REV.
271, 283–84 (1994) [hereinafter Koch, Presiding Officials].
86
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 715–17.
87
415 U.S. 199 (1974).
88
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 716.
89
See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Surprises in the Ruiz Case, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 823, 843 (1975) (“Administrative law would benefit if part V of the Ruiz
81
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reading of it is also open to doubt.90 He went on to rely on Skidmore v. Swift & Co.91
for the proposition that a nonlegislative rule should carry weight with the courts only
in proportion to its “power to persuade.”92 Yet, that case speaks to judicial review of
agency interpretations of law; it is hard to accept the implication that an administrative
judge should be able to depart from any agency guidance document, including a statement of policy, whenever the judge thinks the document “unpersuasive.”93 In short,
I am sure that Charles’s intuition was correct, but there is a need for further analysis.
The issue of agencies’ leeway to control administrative judges through policy
guidance has rarely been litigated, but an interesting New Hampshire state court decision provides a context for discussion. In Asmussen v. Commissioner, New Hampshire
Department of Safety,94 the assistant commissioner of the State department of safety
held a meeting with the hearings examiners in the department who presided over administrative license suspension (ALS) hearings.95 At the meeting, he directed the examiners to admit hearsay evidence and to ask questions of police officers to help them
fulfill their burden of proof;96 admonished them to keep reports brief and not to conduct
hearings as though they were courtroom trials;97 and directed them “not to dismiss a
proceeding automatically on technical grounds,” but [instead] to allow the police officer
to proffer the required proof.98 And, in a remark that the hearings examiners may have
thought added insult to injury, he cautioned the examiners not to “act like judges.”99
The department followed up with a memorandum reiterating these instructions.100
There was no doubt that the assistant commissioner regarded the memorandum as
binding on the examiners. At a later meeting, he told the examiners that if they could
opinion could be erased from the reports.”); Merrill, supra note 81, at 583–84 (describing
Ruiz as a “remarkable” case); Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies
Break Their Own “Laws,” 64 TEX. L. REV. 1, 18 (1985) (“[T]he Ruiz Court simply overstated
the applicable principle [in several respects].”).
90
In Ruiz, the Court declined to enforce criteria in an unpublished Bureau of Indian Affairs
manual that purported to deny general assistance benefits to otherwise eligible Indians. 415
U.S. at 236–37. The Court said that such a denial of benefits could only be made pursuant to
published standards, as required by the APA, the agency’s internal procedures, or both. Id. at
230–36. Charles’s interpretation of this ruling as a generalized message that courts or agency
personnel may decline to follow “unfair” applications of a guidance document was, at best,
a debatable inference.
91
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
92
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 717.
93
Elsewhere in his writing on administrative judges as policymakers, Charles did draw
a sharper distinction between law interpretation and policymaking. See Koch, Developing
Social Policy, supra note 8, at 1096–97 & n.7.
94
766 A.2d 678 (N.H. 2000).
95
Id. at 685.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 685–86.
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not carry out department policies, they could resign;101 and he actually did remove one
recalcitrant examiner from ALS hearings until the latter could be “retrained.”102
Litigation challenging the validity of the memorandum was commenced by examiners as well as respondents in ALS proceedings. One question in the case was whether
the assistant commissioner was attempting to exert improper command influence over
the examiners.103 The court firmly rejected that claim:
Part I, Article 35 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides in
part that “it is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as impartial as the lot of humanity will admit.” . . . “A judge is a member
of a separate and independent branch of government, bound only
to decide cases in accordance with the constitution and laws of
New Hampshire and of the United States . . . .” The hearings examiners in this case, by contrast, are employees of the department
of safety, an executive branch agency, and their “impartiality”
must be considered within the context of the policy-making responsibility that officials of the agency, including the assistant
commissioner, hold . . . .
On issues of policy and legal interpretation, hearings examiners are subject to the direction of the agency by which they
are employed, and their independence is accordingly qualified.
Influence ordinarily is not deemed improper unless it is aimed at
affecting the outcome of a particular proceeding. Thus, the assistant commissioner’s “efforts . . . to ensure that [the hearings
examiners’] decisions conformed with his interpretation of relevant law and policy were permissible so long as such efforts did
not directly interfere with ‘live’ decisions.”104
In this case, the court concluded, “[n]one of the instructions were aimed at affecting
the outcome of a particular proceeding,”105 and thus they were permissible despite
their mandatory nature.106
By distinguishing between influence that is “aimed at affecting the outcome of
a particular proceeding”107 and supervision relating to “issues of policy and legal
interpretation,”108 the court in Asmussen found a way to defuse, if not entirely dismiss, objections based on the decisional independence of the hearing examiners.109
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id. at 686.
Id.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 692–93 (citations omitted).
Id. at 693.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 692.
Id.
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In federal administrative law, to which the New Hampshire court looked for inspiration,110 agency heads do, indeed, generally avoid interference with ALJs in their adjudication of individual cases. The APA itself contains some restrictions in this vein.111
Moreover, customary administrative law practice has transcended the limited statutory
provisions on point. The norm is that there should be little if any direct contact between ALJs and other agency personnel respecting decisions in individual cases, except in hearings on the record.112 For non-ALJ adjudicators, the norm of independence
is less entrenched in law, but reportedly not very different in practice, at least for fulltime administrative judges.113 The 2010 revision of the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act adopted a similar principle for use at the state level, and that specific
provision triggered little if any controversy during the drafting process.114
To be sure, as Charles noted, the administrative judge’s insulation from consultation with knowledgeable staff members within the agency bolsters the underlying Koch
thesis that such judges should not be regarded as policymakers.115 But, regardless, the
court in Asmussen found that this norm was largely beside the point, because the assistant commissioner’s issuance of policy guidance did not entail intervention into specific
cases.116 Indeed, it was akin to rulemaking, to which the ex parte contact restrictions
associated with adjudication generally do not apply.117
110

Id. at 693–94.
5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1) (2006) (forbidding ALJs to “consult a person or party on a fact in
issue, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate”); § 554(d)(2) (forbidding
agency staff who perform adversary functions to supervise ALJs). See generally ABA SECTION
OF ADMIN. L. & REG. PRACTICE, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION 156–58
(Jeffrey B. Litwak ed., 2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter ABA ADJUDICATION GUIDE].
112
See William F. Pedersen, Jr., The Decline of Separation of Functions in Regulatory
Agencies, 64 VA. L. REV. 991, 1009–10 (1978); Antonin Scalia, Chairman’s Message,
Separation of Functions: Obscurity Preserved, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. v, viii–ix (Wint. 1982).
113
See John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal Government,
44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261, 343–45 (1992); see also Koch, Presiding Officials, supra note 85,
at 278–79 (noting survey results indicating that AJs perceive less agency interference with their
decisional independence than ALJs do).
114
MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 408(b) (2010). In contrast, the Act’s extension
of separation of functions restrictions to contacts between agency heads and nonadversary staff,
section 408(e), was at odds with prevailing law and enormously controversial. See Michael
Asimow, Contested Issues in Contested Cases: Adjudication Under the 2010 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, 20 WIDENER L.J. 707, 721–39 (2011).
115
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 712–13 n.98; see also Pedersen, supra note 112,
at 1010.
116
The court cited in this connection to the case law that grew out of the so-called Bellmon
review program, through which the Social Security Administration attempted to control adjudication of disability cases during the Reagan administration. See Asmussen v. Comm’r, N.H.
Dep’t of Safety, 766 A.2d 678, 692–93 (2000). Judicial responses to Bellmon review were, in
fact, mixed, depending on whether judges in particular cases perceived the program as exerting
de facto pressure to deny benefits claims. See ABA ADJUDICATION GUIDE, supra note 111, at
216–17 n.85.
117
In support of ex parte contacts in rulemaking, the court relied on the well-known case
of Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405–08 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and the discussion of it in
111
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In dictum at least, the D.C. Circuit has staked out a similar position to that of
the New Hampshire court. In CropLife America v. EPA,118 the EPA issued a directive declaring that it would no longer evaluate the safety of pesticides by relying on
human studies prepared by outside parties, except where such reliance was “legally
required.”119 One issue in the case was whether the quoted phrase meant that the directive left the agency’s ALJs free to “require” consideration of such studies.120 The court
rejected this interpretation of the directive, stating that “the reality of agency operations makes it clear that ALJs cannot independently rule on the legality of third-party
human studies, because they may not ignore the Administrator’s unequivocal statement prohibiting the agency from considering such studies.”121
B. What Agencies Should Do
If one accepts the teachings of authorities such as Asmussen and CropLife, an
agency may use guidance documents, as well as rules, to constrain administrative
judges. Indeed, this can be an important facet of effective program management, especially at agencies with large caseloads.122 Charles’s article started from that premise
Charles’s treatise. Asmussen, 766 A.2d at 693 (citing 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.10, at 454 (1985)).
118
329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
119
Id. at 878.
120
Id. at 881.
121
Id. at 882; see also Auth. of Educ. Dep’t Admin. Law Judges in Conducting Hearings,
14 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2 (1990) (“ALJs are bound by all policy directives and rules promulgated
by their agency, including the agency’s interpretations of those policies and rules. . . . [T]hey
owe the same allegiance to the Secretary’s policies and regulations as any other Department
employee.” (citations omitted)). The CropLife example is ambiguous in that the court called the
press release a “binding regulation.” 329 F.3d at 881. However, the court’s word choice should
not be read too literally. It is an example of the tendency among many courts to reclassify an
informal document as “legislative” en route to holding that an agency should have engaged
in notice and comment before promulgating it. I agree with Professor Anthony that this usage
is imprecise, because such a document cannot “be” a legislative rule. Robert A. Anthony, A
Taxonomy of Federal Agency Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (2000). A better formulation is that, in such a case, a court is misusing, or is expected to misuse, a guidance document
by treating it as though it were binding.
122
See, e.g., ACUS Recommendation 2013-1, Improving Consistency in Social Security
Disability Adjudications, 78 Fed. Reg 41,352, 41,354, ¶ 3(a) (June 10, 2013) (“The [Social
Security Administration’s] Appeals Council should advise and assist policymakers and decisionmakers [in disability benefits cases] by . . . [i]ssuing Appeals Council Interpretations (ACIs),
with greater frequency, in order to: [a]ddress policy gaps; promote greater consistency and uniformity throughout the adjudicatory process; and establish precedents upon which claimants
and their representatives may rely.”); Grant Bagley, Current Procedures and Standards for
Making Medicare Coverage Decisions, in GUIDE TO MEDICARE COVERAGE DECISION-MAKING
AND APPEALS 17, 36–37 (Eleanor D. Kinney ed., 2002) [hereinafter ABA MEDICARE GUIDE]
(discussing proposals for use of guidance documents regarding Medicare coverage issues).
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and went on to address the issue of how agencies should use that authority. In brief, his
position was roughly the same as the advice he gave with respect to the application of
stare decisis to precedents, as I have discussed above.123 That overlap is hardly surprising. After all, various commentators, including myself, have argued that agency guidance documents are in many ways analytically equivalent to case law precedents.124
More specifically, Charles returned to his thesis that agency heads should consider
accepting and benefitting from administrative judges’ occasional deviations from the
policies stated in rules and guidance documents. He thought that this process was important to the ongoing development of agency policy. “Policy change must percolate
up through the process, and hence each level has a role in sharpening [a] rule through
interpretation.”125 Experience with the application of a rule can point towards adjustments over time. Thus, for example, “a potential policy-making contribution exists
when judges look behind [the language of a] rule to conclude that strict application of
the rule would not further its purpose in the individual case before them”;126 such a creative move might “launch a policy inquiry throughout the administrative hierarchy.”127
On the other hand, Charles also cautioned that administrative judges should
“generally . . . give effect to both nonlegislative and legislative rules,”128 in part to
protect the reliance interests of citizens who look to rules and other policy pronouncements for guidance. He also saw a need for “strong agency review to reassert the value
of consistency, the authority of the agency over policy, and any process values compromised by straying from the rule as promulgated.”129 Importantly, he argued that
the necessary “balanc[e] between flexibility and stability”130 did not have to be the
same in every administrative context; “[e]ach individual administrative program may
strike the appropriate balance differently, determining the appropriate attitude for the
agency’s judges to take towards agency rules and policy pronouncements.”131 The goal
of these accommodations was to integrate administrative judges’ perspectives into the
enterprise: “Policymaking should be seen as a coordinated effort in which the judge’s
individual decisions contribute to policy development rather than an adversarial process in which the judge struggles against the agency’s policymaking efforts.”132
123

See supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text.
See Ronald M. Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 41
DUKE L.J. 1497, 1501–02 (1992); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 893, 934–37 (2004); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J.
1463, 1472–74, 1486 (1992); cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001)
(“Interpretive rules may sometimes function as precedents.”).
125
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 718.
126
Id.
127
Koch, Developing Social Policy, supra note 8, at 1101.
128
Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 719 (emphasis added).
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
124
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The theses that Charles aired in his article echoed the themes of a recent law reform
debate in which I participated.133 I served for a few years as the ABA advisor to the
drafting committee for what became the 2010 MSAPA. As a practical matter, I acted
as a liaison between the committee and the ABA’s Administrative Law Section. At one
point the committee tentatively adopted a provision that was intended to confirm the
non-binding nature of agency guidance documents:
A guidance document may be considered by a presiding officer
or final decision maker in an agency adjudication for its persuasive effect but the guidance document does not have the force and
effect of law and does not bind the presiding officer and the final
decision maker in the exercise of discretion.134
What troubled me about this language was that it appeared to say that the impact of
a guidance document on a presiding officer (i.e., an ALJ) in a contested case should
be the same as its impact on an agency head, despite the different roles that these two
figures play in the agency’s hierarchical structure. It could be read to suggest, for
example, that if the appointed head of an agency publishes a pro-management policy
statement, and a pro-labor ALJ is not “persuaded” by it, the ALJ must be free to go
her own way.
I brought the proposed language before the Council of the Administrative Law
Section for discussion. The ensuing deliberation reflected a belief that the propriety of
an ALJ’s decision to depart from an agency policy statement may depend on context.
Some Council members argued that if a policy statement were twenty years old and
apparently out of sync with the agency’s current regulatory approach, the ALJ might
well decide to assume that the agency heads would not adhere to it if asked, or at least
should open up the disputed issue for fuller consideration. This argument attracted
significant support. But, others argued, what if the agency head then reaffirmed its
policy, and the ALJ nevertheless declined to adhere to the agency’s view in an indistinguishable case six months later? There was general agreement that an ALJ’s “creative
deviation” from the policy statement would be much harder, if not impossible, to justify under those circumstances. In short, the Council’s discussion was marked by essentially the same striving for nuance that one sees in Charles’s scholarship in this area.
At the same time, the discussion also implied that the MSAPA drafters would be wise
to avoid trying to settle too much about the hierarchical relationship between ALJs and
agency heads through legislation. After I reported the Council’s discussion to the drafting committee, it replaced the provision quoted above with milder language, which
appears in the 2010 MSAPA as adopted.135
133

In fact, this experience was part of what impelled me to commence the correspondence
with Charles that I have been discussing in this essay.
134
MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 310(g) (Apr. 6, 2009) (working draft) (on file
with author).
135
See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 311(f) (2010) (“A guidance document
may be considered by a presiding officer or final decision maker in an agency adjudication, but
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One additional situation in which courts frequently consider whether a guidance
document or policy statement is “binding” occurs when a litigant claims that such a
document should have been issued through the notice-and-comment procedures of the
APA.136 Among the few cases that have considered how this doctrine applies to administrative judges is Warder v. Shalala.137 In that case, plaintiffs challenged an interpretive
ruling by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) that narrowly construed
the Medicare Act’s criteria for reimbursement of medical expenses.138 In rejecting this
challenge, the First Circuit declared that “[a]n interpretative rule binds an agency’s
employees, including its ALJs, but it does not bind the agency itself.”139 The phrasing of this declaration was somewhat overstated, or at least obscure. In fact, the First
it does not bind the presiding officer and the final decision maker in the exercise of discretion.”).
Even this revised subsection (f) is troublesome insofar as it declares that a guidance document
“does not bind” a presiding officer. Read for all it could be worth, that proposition would be
inconsistent with Asmussen and kindred authorities. A benign interpretation of the sentence
would be that it is intended to allow a private party that disagrees with an agency guidance
document to contest it at both the hearing and agency appeal levels—but the provision does
not prevent a presiding officer from saying (or even being instructed to say) that any decision
to abandon the policy will have to be made by the final decisionmaker. This interpretation
would harmonize subsection (f) with other language in section 311 that overtly seeks to preserve vertical relationships within the administrative hierarchy. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. However, subsection (f) can also be read as directly inviting ALJs to override
agency policies with which they may disagree. For this reason, states that are considering
enactment of section 311 would be well advised to omit this subsection and thereby avoid
unnecessary confusion.
136
In Asmussen itself, the New Hampshire court held that some, though not all, of the
assistant commissioner’s memoranda should have been issued through rulemaking procedure. Asmussen v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Safety, 766 A.2d 678, 694–95 (N.H. 2000). I will
not discuss this part of the court’s opinion in depth, because it revolved around applications
of an unusual New Hampshire statute that expressly defines “rule” to include statements that
“prescribe . . . policy, procedure or practice requirement[s] binding on persons outside
the agency.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:1(XV) (2013) (emphasis added). The critical
question, therefore, was whether various directives, nominally addressed to hearings examiners, were nevertheless “binding on persons outside the agency.” See Asmussen, 766
A.2d at 693. This analysis resembled the reasoning that a federal court might use in applying
the federal APA exemption that allows rules “relating to agency management or personnel”
to be issued without notice and comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2006); see, e.g., Tunik v.
MSPB, 407 F.3d 1326, 1342–44 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a regulation that protected
ALJs from being removed from pending cases was outside the scope of the exemption, despite its relevance to “personnel,” because “the removal of ALJs implicates not only the
rights of an individual ALJ being removed, but also the broader interest of the public in having private rights adjudicated by persons who have some independence from the agency
opposing them”).
137
149 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 1998).
138
Id. at 75.
139
Id. at 82 (quoting KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 6.3, at 104 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1997)).
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Circuit may have misapplied the distinction in Warder itself.140 However, I think the
court was on the right track. Its distinction reflected, if somewhat ambiguously, the
emerging understanding that an agency may legitimately use a guidance document to
bind its employees if it also ensures that affected persons will have an adequate opportunity to contest the document at some later stage in the administrative process, i.e.,
at a higher level in the bureaucracy.141 Under this reasoning, an agency has discretion
to open up a guidance document to challenge at the administrative judge level or not.
In fact, the HCFA (now the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services) apparently
does allow such challenges in some circumstances and not in others.142 The tradeoff
between efficiency and percolation can be different in varying contexts. Again, an attractive feature of such discretion is that it leaves the agency free to make the kind of
prudential choices that Charles advocated, instead of having to apply a conceptual test
of whether the guidance document is “binding” or not.
Writing about Warder in a listserv post shortly after the case was decided, Professor William Jordan commented that “it is legal and may be appropriate for the
agency to bind its ALJs to interpretations that the agency itself has already adopted.
Indeed, in the HCFA context, this is important as [a] matter of agency management
in order to achieve a degree of consistency among many ALJ decisions.”143 However,
he continued:
This proposition does not necessarily mean [that] it is wise for
the agency to bind its ALJs in this way. There may be value in
140

The district court stated that the HCFA ruling in dispute “is binding on all HCFA components, including the ALJs who hear Medicare appeals.” Warder v. Shalala, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7029, *14–15 (D. Mass. May 7, 1997). Even more telling, perhaps, was the same
court’s statement that “because the Ruling is binding on all levels of HCFA, it would be
futile to require the plaintiffs to pursue this challenge administratively before allowing it to
be brought in federal court.” Id. at *18 n.10. Although the court of appeals did reverse the district court, it did not take issue with the statements just quoted. Thus, it seems possible that the
HCFA ruling did “bind the agency itself,” in which case the plaintiffs’ procedural challenge
should have succeeded.
141
See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices,
72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3436–37 (Jan. 25, 2007) (stating that significant guidance documents should
not contain “mandatory language . . . unless . . . the language is addressed to agency staff and
will not foreclose consideration by the agency of positions advanced by affected private
parties”); MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 311(c) (2010) (“A guidance document
may contain binding instructions to agency staff members if, at an appropriate stage in the
administrative process, the agency’s procedures provide an affected person an adequate opportunity to contest the legality or wisdom of a position taken in the document.”).
142
Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Beneficiary Appeals Processes, in ABA MEDICARE
GUIDE, supra note 122, at 65, 74–75; cf. Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625, 631 n.10 (9th
Cir. 2004) (stating that local coverage determinations in Medicare “do not bind ALJs or the
federal courts”).
143
Posting of William S. Jordan, III, jordan@uakron.edu, to adminlaw@chicagokent.kent
law.edu (Sept. 10, 1998) (on file with author).
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leaving the issue open for ALJs to grapple with and refine through
the adjudicatory process. This would presumably strengthen any
decision the agency ultimately makes because the agency would
have had to consider contrary positions in greater depth. But management concerns . . . may override [this] interest . . . .144
Aficionados of irony will appreciate the coincidence (if it was one) that Bill Jordan,
Charles’s future casebook collaborator, so perfectly anticipated the thrust of the analysis that Charles would afterwards articulate in greater depth in the article discussed in
this essay.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing reflections on Charles’s view of administrative judges as policymakers are intended to be exploratory, not definitive. I hope that they evoke, even if
they cannot fully capture, Charles’s capacity for subtlety and nuance. His work in
this area of administrative adjudication, as in many other areas, bears appreciation
for its attention to and respect for complexities. Even where one could disagree with
his conclusions, the work is stimulating and valuable. If this short essay lacks some
of that subtlety,145 I hope it will have the offsetting virtue of continuing the dialogue
and making his perceptions more widely known within the world of administrative
law scholarship.

144

Id.
In the interest of brevity, I have refrained from addressing a few incidental themes in
Charles’s article, notably his discussion of cognitive errors and perceptual distortions that may
influence administrative judges (like other people). See Koch, Policymaking, supra note 8,
at 720–26.
145

